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AGAINST THE ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF  
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Sam Fox Krauss1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We should take into account the relevant evidence. This is a general 
principle in epistemology and in evidence law, and is expressly stated in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.2 Where the evidence is, or is likely to be, 
inaccurate, it should be discounted or excluded from consideration. And the 
same where the evidence is accurate but likely to mislead.3 In some cases, 
there is controversy about what kinds of evidence are likely to be inaccurate, 
or likely to mislead. But it is uncontroversial that when evidence is inaccurate 
or misleading, this provides a strong if not decisive reason for excluding or 
discounting that evidence: reasoning with such evidence inhibits factfinding. 
Call these reasons for exclusion accuracy-based epistemic reasons. At other 
times, the weight we accord evidence is not determined solely by accuracy-
based reasons, but rather by what might be referred to as policy reasons. For 
 
1 J.D. candidate, NYU Law; Ph.D., UT-Austin. 
2 See, e.g., Amit Pundik, The Epistemology of Statistical Evidence, 15 INT. J. EVID. 
PROOF 117–143, 137 (2011).; “Federal Rules of Evidence” (FRE) Rule 402 (Allowing all 
relevant evidence unless expressly proscribed).  
3 For example, FRE Rule 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence “…if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury…” Marcello Di Bello and Collin 
O’Neil make a similar point, noting that admitting probative evidence can be 
counterproductive if factfinders mis-weigh it. Marcello Di Bello & Collin O’Neil, Profile 
Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions, ETHICS, 3 (forthcoming).   
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example, some philosophers have argued that we ought to defer, against the 
evidence, to friends.4  
The consensus view among legal scholars and philosophers is that 
statistical evidence should not, on its own, be sufficient for conviction in a 
criminal case or a ruling in a civil case. With few notable exceptions, neither 
legal scholars nor philosophers give accuracy-based epistemic reasons for 
excluding or discounting statistical evidence.5 For the most part, philosophers 
have given non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. That is, statistical 
evidence is deficient in some epistemic virtue, but this deficiency is not one 
that would inhibit factfinding. Legal scholars have mostly given policy-based 
reasons.6 
I argue that we should not discount statistical evidence. Further, 
statistical evidence should be sufficient, on its own, for conviction in a 
criminal trial or a ruling in a civil trial.7 I start with a presumption that all 
 
4 See, e.g., Sarah Stroud, Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498–524 
(2006); Simon Keller, Friendship and Belief, 33 PHILOS. PAP. 329–351 (2004). (Arguing that 
we should sometimes defer, against the evidence, to friends). But see Jason Kawall, 
Friendship and Epistemic Norms, 165 PHILOS. STUD. 349–370 (2013). (Responding to 
Stroud and Keller).  
5 See, e.g., Marcello Di Bello, Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough 
to Convict?, MIND 1–40 (2018). 
6 Infra, notes 11-15. 
7 I’m not the first person to say that non-accuracy based epistemic reasons don’t lead 
neatly to a conclusion that statistical evidence should not be sufficient for legal 
responsibility. See, especially, David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical 
Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 PHILOS. PUBLIC AFF. 197–224 
(2012); David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and Instrumental 
Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STANFORD LAW REV. 557–610 (2015). (Giving 
policy-based reasons for thinking that statistical evidence’s insensitivity provides a perverse 
incentive to wrongdoers in some cases, and arguing, generally, that the court should be more 
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relevant evidence should receive its due. The main claim of this article is that 
the considerations scholars give in favor of statistical evidence’s 
insufficiency do not overcome this presumption. Even if the considerations 
on offer are compelling, demoting statistical evidence imposes great costs. 
Broad pronouncements about epistemic desiderata, I think, draw attention 
away from the purpose of the trial, which is, at bottom, a factfinding mission.8 
Of course, this is not the only goal—if it were, then the Exclusionary Rule, 
which renders probative evidence inadmissible if it was obtained unlawfully, 
would not exist. But often the discussions seem to miss the cost to accuracy, 
which in turn is a cost to victims of crimes, their families, to future victims, 
and to those who suffer torts. In an article on this topic, Duncan Pritchard 
makes a claim about error in trials: “In short, we want a criminal justice 
system that excludes high levels of risk of wrongful conviction, where risk is 
understood modally rather than probabilistically.”9 It is unclear why anyone 
 
concerned with factfinding than with knowledge); Pundik, “The Epistemology of Statistical 
Evidence,” 122, fn 27: “Proponents of the distinction [between admissible and inadmissible 
statistical evidence] need to provide a more refined distinction between acceptable and 
problematic statistical evidence, together with some explanation as to why any differential 
treatment of objectionable statistical evidence should not apply to types of statistical 
evidence they consider acceptable.”; Amit Pundik, What is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? 
The Attempts to Establish an Epistemic Deficiency, 27 CIV. JUSTICE Q. 461–493, 463 (2008). 
(Arguing that none of the epistemic reasons “successfully establish[] an epistemic deficiency 
from which (only) statistical evidence suffers”); Lewis Ross, Rehabilitating Statistical 
Evidence, PHILOS. PHENOMENOL. RES. (2019). (Arguing, partially because of the ubiquity of 
DNA evidence in trials, and partly because legal factfinders are not able to hedge in the way 
that individual reasons are, scholars ought to be less averse toward statistical evidence.)  
8 “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of the truth.” (Tehan v. U.S. 383 U.S. 
406, 416)(1966)) Quoted in LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN 
ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (2006). 
9 Duncan Pritchard, Risk, 46 METAPHILOSOPHY 436–461, 454 (2015). 
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affected by the risk of wrongful conviction would prefer a modal conception 
of risk, even if it has theoretical virtues. One would think that the people 
involved with and affected by trials would care primarily about accuracy. The 
Court has alluded to this many times.10 And, in the absence of sufficient 
countervailing reasons to prize non-accuracy-based epistemic virtues over 
accuracy, it’s difficult to see why those reasons ought to prevail.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, I describe the problem 
statistical evidence presents in the law. In brief, the following sort of dilemma 
arises: Factfinders in trials are charged with reaching a verdict if the evidence 
presented meets a specified standard of proof. It seems that purely statistical 
evidence can suffice for just such a level of certainty in a variety of cases 
where a powerful intuition is that it would nonetheless be wrong to convict 
the defendant, or find in favor of the plaintiff, on merely statistical evidence. 
So, one either has to convict with statistical evidence, in spite of an intuition 
that this is unsettling, or else explain what (dispositive) deficiency statistical 
evidence has.  
Second, I discuss the reasons philosophers give for statistical 
 
10 “Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in criminal prosecutions 
is heavily handicapped. It must be justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the 
Constitution or the law of the land.” Nardone v. U.S., 308 US 388 (1939) at 340; “…this 
admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of 
constitutional and statutory protections.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) at 442; “The 
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs[.]” Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 
(2006) at 591. 
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evidence’s deficiency—mostly non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. In 
general, the arguments follow the following form: For evidence to be 
sufficient for knowledge or belief, it has to have one or another epistemic 
properties. Statistical evidence lacks these properties, for one reason or 
another. The factfinder must have the relevant belief, or knowledge, in order 
to convict a defendant or award a judgment to a plaintiff. Therefore, statistical 
evidence cannot be sufficient for conviction or a judgment. I don’t argue that 
the relevant philosophers are mistaken about statistical evidence’s lacking the 
properties they identify. Rather, I argue that these philosophers focus too 
much on the first two premises and not enough on the third—that the right 
kind of belief or knowledge is necessary (let alone desirable) in the legal 
context. Sarah Moss, for example, argues that criminal defendants have a 
right that the jury know that they are guilty and that statistical evidence, itself, 
is not sufficient for that kind of knowledge.11 Even if we grant the second 
point, which is part of the argument of her sophisticated and well-received 
book, Moss offers no good reason to accept the first.  
In the evidence law literature, scholars mostly give what I’ve called 
“policy” reasons against the sufficiency of statistical evidence for conviction 
or judgment: it undermines a defendant’s right to be treated as an individual;12 
 
11 “According to my account, defendants have the right to be convicted on the basis of 
nothing less than knowledge.” SARAH MOSS, PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE 215 (2018). 
12 David T Wasserman, The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken 
Liability, 13 CARDOZO LAW REV. 935–976, 943 (1991). (But noting that where the statistical 
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it can be difficult to determine which reference class someone ought to be 
considered a member of;13 it requires an overt admission of error;14 it 
provides an incentives for misconduct;15 and, for legitimacy reasons, the 
public has to be able to treat the verdict as a conclusion about something that 
happened, which, we have reason to think, may not be the case if the verdict 
is based on statistical evidence.16 I won’t discuss these at length in the article; 
 
evidence does not “involve an inference to the defendant’s conduct from the frequency of 
similar conduct,” as in, e.g., fingerprint analysis, to that extent the statistical evidence may 
be unproblematic.) For a response to Wasserman, see Federico Picinali, Base-rates of 
Negative Traits: Instructions for Use in Criminal Trials: Base-rates of Negative Traits, 33 J. 
APPL. PHILOS. 69–87, 73–75 (2016). 
13 Mark Colyvan, Helen M. Regan & Scott Ferson, Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference 
Class?, 9 J. POLIT. PHILOS. 168–181 (2001). 
14 “There is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal 
while telling oneself, ‘I believe there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is 
innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the 
interest of the public’s—and my own—safety.” Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process,” 1372, quoted in Jonathan J. Koehler, When do Courts Think 
Base Rate Statistics are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS 373–402, 337 (2002). 
15 Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher, supra note 7 at 220–23. (Arguing that because statistical 
evidence is not sensitive, its sufficiency for a judgment incentivizes an opportunistic actor 
to, for example, gate-crash. Thus, while statistical evidence’s insensitivity is not itself a 
reason against relying on it, there are policy-reasons arising from its insensitive that count 
against doing so. (Someone’s belief is sensitive just in case were the belief false, the person 
wouldn’t belief it. Some philosophers have argued that sensitivity is a necessary condition 
on knowledge. For an overview, see generally Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, 
The Analysis of Knowledge, Summer 2018 Edition THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., ), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/. For a brief 
response to this line of reasoning, see Di Bello and O’Neil, supra note 3 at 6–7. 
16 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability 
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. LAW REV. 1357 (1985). As Tracy Meares describes it, Nesson argues 
for legitimacy even at the cost of accuracy, “…where legitimacy is defined as public 
acceptance.” Tracey L Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law 
and Procedure--and Three Answers, 2002 UNIV. ILL. LAW REV. 851–847, 859 (2002). For 
criticism of Nesson’s view, see H. L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE 
SEARCH FOR TRUTH 59–61 (2008); Ronald Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts Thesis, 66 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 541 (1986); Neil Cohen, The 
Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and Aversion to Statistical Evidence, 66 
BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 563 (1986).   
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my focus is on non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. Some of the policy 
reasons require a kind of empirical analysis that is beyond the scope of this 
project. Moreover, they involves a sort of weighing of costs and benefits that 
I’m not prepared to undertake.17 
Third, I discuss how the philosophical literature is out of touch with 
the legal reality—that outside of toy cases discussed (though some are based 
on actual cases), the courts allow statistical evidence to be sufficient in a 
variety of contexts. For example, in the civil context, statistical evidence can 
be sufficient where either the harm is collective or else it is impossible to tell 
who, exactly, is responsible for the harm. More controversially, so-called 
“risk assessments tools” are used, increasingly,18 in various criminal justice 
contexts.19 Of course, that the practice exists in other contexts does not itself 
justify the practice, but to the extent that these practices have become 
accepted for principled reasons, it does. The various considerations I advance 
lead to the conclusion that when it comes to naked statistical evidence, 
philosophers who argue for its insufficiency have got it wrong. 
 
17 As Koehler and Shaviro write, the determination “of whether, on balance, greater use 
of overtly probabilistic evidence and methods at trial is desirable…depends on the value 
attached to specific policy concerns other than verdict accuracy.” Jonathan J Koehler & 
Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly 
Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL LAW REV. 247–279, 248 (1990). 
18 Brandon L Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO LAW REV. 101, 
103–4 (2019). 
19 See, for a descriptive analysis of risk assessment in pretrial bail determinations, in 
particular, SARAH L DESMARAIS & EVAN M LOWDER, Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools: A 
Primer for Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys (2019). (Cited in Garrett, supra note 
18 at 102.) 
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I.  THE PROBLEM STATISTICAL EVIDENCE POSES IN TRIALS 
 
A.  The Paradox 
 
As a rough approximation, “statistical evidence” in the legal 
epistemology literatures refers to evidence from which the factfinder draws a 
statistical inference to the defendant’s guilt or liability. While it may be 
specious to distinguish “statistical evidence” from other kinds of evidence, 
I’ll stick to this terminology for consistency’s sake. Scholars in this literature 
distinguish between individualized, or particularized, evidence, on the one 
hand, which is said to be “about” the defendant, and statistical evidence, on 
the other, which is not.  Base rates, for example, are described as “statistical 
evidence.” Witness statements are not. More philosophically sophisticated 
scholars working in this area, however, have pointed out that this taxonomy 
of different kinds of evidence is suspect.20 
The statistical evidence is usually about a reference class. For 
example, assume that we have no knowledge of Simon’s shoe preferences. 
But he is a late-twenties male, and we have robust data about the shoe-buying 
 
20 See, e.g., Pardo, “The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide,” 262, fn 128; 
Shaviro, “Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice,” 530 (Challenging 
this distinction and arguing that it is ill-defined in the literature). Ron Allen makes a more 
strident comment: “the assumption that there are two qualitatively distinct types of evidence, 
statistical and non-statistical, is essentially false.” Ronald J Allen, On the Significance of 
Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the “Naked Statistical Evidence” 
Debate, the Meaning of “Evidence,” and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt, 65 TULANE LAW REV. 1093–1110, 1093 (1991). Judge Posner in Riordan v. 
Kempiners, 831 F.2d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998): “All evidence is probabilistic—statistical 
evidence merely explicitly so.” (cited in Koehler 2002, 401, fn 165). 
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practices of late-twenties males. Thus, we have statistical evidence of 
Simon’s shoe preferences, even though we don’t know anything about 
Simon, individually. In contrast, if Simon had made a statement about his 
love of Nikes, or if someone said they had heard Simon had made the 
statement, then we would have particularized evidence.  
In the legal context, a conviction or particular ruling is warranted 
when the government or plaintiff meets the relevant standard of proof. And 
it seems that statistical evidence, sometimes, is sufficient to meet this 
burden.21 Why then, does it seem inappropriate to convict or find as the 
evidence suggests, when the evidence is statistical in nature? One scholar 
writes that doing so would be “dubious.”22  In the relevant literature, a few 
cases have come to be canonical representations of the problem. Two civil 
cases and one criminal case will illustrate :  
Blue Bus 
Suppose it is late at night…and an individual’s car is hit 
by a bus. This individual cannot identify the bus, but she can 
establish that it is a blue bus, and she can prove as well that 80 
percent of the blue buses in the city are operated by the Blue 
Bus Company, that 20 percent are operated by the Red Bus 
Company, and that there are no buses in the vicinity except 
 
21 See Pardo, supra note 20 at 253.: “What makes the examples ‘paradoxical’ is that the 
evidence appears on its face to surpass the applicable standard of proof and, yet, the judgment 
of most people is that the evidence is insufficient to prove liability or guilt. This apparent 
inconsistency between what the applicable legal rules appear to require, on the one hand, and 
judgments about what the correct result ought to be, on the other, creates a tension that calls 
out for explanation.”  
22 See Georgi Gardiner, Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY , 3 (David Coady & James Chase eds., 
forthcoming). 
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those operated by one of those two companies…..In these 
circumstances can the plaintiff recover in civil litigation 
against the Blue Bus Company, or, if not…then why not?23 
 
Gatecrasher 
Consider a case in which it is common ground that 499 
people paid for admission to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are 
counted on the seats, of whom A is one. Suppose no tickets 
were issued and there can be no testimony as to whether A 
paid for admission or climbed over the fence. So there is a 
.501 probability, on the admitted facts, that he did not pay. 
The conventionally accepted theory of probability would 
apparently imply that in such circumstances the rodeo 
organizers are entitled to judgment against A for the 
admission money, since the balance of the probability would 
lie in their favor. But is seems manifestly unjust that A should 
lose when there is an agreed probability of as high as .499 that 
he in fact paid for admission.24 
 
Prison Yard 
In an enclosed yard are twenty-five identically dressed 
prisoners and a prison guard. The sole witness is too far away 
to distinguish individual features. He sees the guard, 
recognizable by his uniform, trip and fall, apparently 
knocking himself out. The prisoners huddle and argue. One 
breaks away from the others and goes to a shed in the corner 
of the yard to hide. The other twenty-four set upon the fallen 
guard and kill him. After the killing, the hidden prisoner 
emerges from the shed and mixes with the other prisoners. 
When the authorities later enter the yard, they find the dead 
guard and the twenty-five prisoners. Given these facts, 
twenty-four of the twenty-five are guilty of murder.25 
 
 
23 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 82 (2003). (This 
case is modeled on Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945)). 
24 David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, ARIZ. STATE LAW J. 
101–109, 101 (1979). (This case was originally presented in L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE 
AND THE PROVABLE (1977).).  
25 Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity, 92 HARV. LAW REV. 1187, 1192–3 (1979). 
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 In the above cases, the relevant standard of proof seem to be met.26 
And yet, the intuition of most scholars, and, in some cases, the courts, is that 
it has not been. Describing the Blue Bus case, for example, Sean Sullivan 
writes, “Everyone agrees that Bayesian logic compels this result, but no one 
seriously thinks it is the right outcome.”27 Describing the actual case on 
which Blue Bus is based, Andrea Roth writes that the court ruled in favor of 
the defendant because “…a rational prediction by the jury based on the 
evidence ‘was not enough’ absent an ‘actual belief’ in liability ‘in the mind 
or minds of the tribunal.’”28  Others have described basing a judgment on 
purely statistical evidence as “patently absurd.”29 In addition, this intuition is 
shared by the participants in several psychology studies, which find, in 
general, that people are reluctant to make liability determinations when the 
evidence is based on naked statistics.30  
On the other hand, the literature features an undue focus on the 
defendant—criminal and civil. When scholars (mostly legal scholars) give 
 
26 There is significant controversy about what standard of proofs are meant to be. I 
largely gloss over these issues.   
27 Sean P. Sullivan, A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-Finding, 90 UNIV. 
COLO. LAW REV., 45 (2019). 
28 Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone is Enough to Convict, 
85 N. Y. UNIV. LAW REV. 1130, 1164 (2010). (Quoting Smith at 755). 
29 Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 
ARIZ. LAW REV. 557–602, 574 (2013). (Cited in Sullivan, supra note 27 at 13.) 
30 Gary L Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 739–752 (1992); Edward Wright et al., Factors 
Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability, 136 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 677–688 
(1996).  
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policy-based reasons for the insufficiency of statistical evidence, they often 
invoke notions of fairness.31 That is, fairness to the defendant. Neglected are 
the costs to the plaintiffs (in civil cases) and on society, and perhaps the 
victims, in criminal cases. In the criminal context, at least part of the 
justification for the criminal justice system is to keep people safe. In a related 
literature, scholars have debated not only what standards of proof mean, but, 
more provocatively, whether we are using the right standards. Using 
estimates of the likelihood of being the victim of a violent crime and being 
falsely convicted of such a crime, respectively, and the relative harms of each, 
Larry Laudan argues that we ought to lower the standard of proof in criminal 
trials.32 Even those who do not agree with Laudan’s analysis recognize the 
substantial costs to ignoring evidence.33  
The Exclusionary Rule, for example, precludes evidence’s admission 
when it is obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.34 For 
example, if the police enter someone’s house without consent or a warrant, 
as usually required by the Fourth Amendment, and discover incriminating 
evidence, that evidence cannot be admitted at trial. This is to disincentivize 
 
31 Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher, supra note 7. is a notable exception.  
32 See, generally, LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS (2016). For a pointed criticism of 
Laudan’s argument, see Georgi Gardiner, In Defence of Reasonable Doubt, 34 J. APPL. 
PHILOS. 221–241 (2017). 
33 Supra, note 9.  
34 Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), incorporated to the states in Mapp v. Ohio 367 
U.S. 643 (1961).  
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police investigators from violating rights in order to obtain probative 
information.35 The Exclusionary Rule and resulting doctrines require that 
factfinders disregard what may be known to be accurate, relevant, 
incriminating, and even dispositive evidence. In general, however, there is no 
right to have unlawfully obtained evidence excluded from trial.36 
Notwithstanding certain disagreements, we ought to recognize the substantial 
costs when throwing away or discounting evidence. As Justice Cardozo 
famously commented on the Exclusionary Rule: “The criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”37 
Without stating a position on the purpose of the criminal justice 
 
35 Although the Supreme Court has given different rationales for the Exclusionary Rule, 
over time it has all but given up on non-deterrent rationales. In Nardone v. US, the Court 
ruled not only that unlawful phone taps were inadmissible, but also evidence derived from 
the unlawful tap. (308 US 338, 341)(1939). To do otherwise, the Court held, would be “ 
‘inconsistent with the ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.”(id). That was in 
1939. In 1961, the court in Mapp called the exclusionary rule an “essential part of both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”(at 657). In Hudson v. Michigan, the majority writes 
“the exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its deterrence benefits outweigh 
its substantial social costs.” (Hudson v. Michigan 547 US 586, 594 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). Note the departure from the lofty language in earlier cases. Indeed, for the majority 
in Hudson, Justice Scalia writes that the Court has revised its view on the expansiveness of 
Mapp: “we have long since rejected that approach.” (at 591). Justice Scalia writes that the 
“massive remedy” of exclusion “has never been applied except where its deterrence benefits 
outweigh its substantial social costs.”(Hudson at 595)(internal citations omitted). In Hudson, 
we see the completion of the Court’s transformation from relying on reasons of Fourth 
Amendment protections or judicial integrity to purely the deterrent benefit of the 
exclusionary rule. 
36 The rights violation is thought to occur when and only when the unlawful search is 
conducted, not when that evidence is admitted at trial. In its decision in Herring v. U.S., the 
Court writes, “…the exclusionary rule is not an individual right…” They continue: “We have 
repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.” (555 U.S. 135, 141)(2009). But some scholars feel differently. See, 
e.g., Richard Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. LAW REV. 1885–1966 
(2014). (Locating the right to exclusion in the 5th Amendment’s Due Process clause.) 
37 People v. Defore 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
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system, or of damage awards, I can safely state an uncontroversial but 
rebuttable presumption: all relevant evidence should receive its due. 
Whatever the function of trials, it is presumptively the case that it is better-
achieved when all relevant evidence is considered.38 I don’t need an argument 
for why there are strong reasons in favor of convicting the guilty, or of 
awarding damages to a plaintiff when they’ve been harmed. Disagreement 
about the function of the trial and the optimal distribution of error will affect 
when the presumption is rebutted, but it’s important to note the cost of such 
a rebuttal, as the Supreme Court repeatedly does.39  
For the kinds of cases described above, philosophers have typically 
defended the common intuition that the courts ought not rely on statistical 
evidence. First, they give some account of the difference between statistical 
evidence and individualized evidence. Then they explain what (decisive) 
normative implications this difference has. Without questioning the 
distinctions that others have drawn between statistical and individualized 
evidence, I argue that the normative implications they draw are either 
misguided, or else, not decisive. That is, the difference between statistical 
 
38 Laudan (ms) “The Social Contract and the Rules of Trial: Re-Thinking Procedural 
Rules.” pp 26-7 Unpublished draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075403. 
39 Nardone v. US, 308 US 388 (1939) at 340: “Any claim for the exclusion of evidence 
logically relevant in criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be justified by an 
over-riding public policy expressed in the Constitution or the law of the land.”; Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) at 442: “this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is 
needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections.”; Hudson 
v Michigan, 547 US 586 (2006) at 591: “The exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social 
costs[.]” 
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evidence and individualized evidence could be relevant but not decisive in 
determining whether a factfinder can rest a particular finding entirely on 
statistical evidence. It is good to keep in mind that shortcomings in statistical 
evidence, whatever they are, are not necessarily decisive against its 
sufficiency.  
B.  Non-Accuracy-Based Epistemic Reasons for the Insufficiency of 
Statistical Evidence 
 
Philosophers have offered a wealth of views to defend the 
insufficiency of statistical evidence. Mostly, the rationalizations have relied 
on what I’ve called non-accuracy-based epistemic considerations. Broadly, 
philosophers have argued either that statistical evidence lacks a property 
necessary for knowledge or that it lacks a property necessary for belief.  
Conceptual analysis of propositional knowledge is often dated to 
Plato’s Theaetetus, in which Socrates asks Theaetetus what knowledge is. 
One of Theaetetus’ answers—that knowledge is justified, true belief40—
remained (mostly) popular until Edmond Gettier’s influential 1963 article, 
“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” answered the titular question in the 
negative.41 So-called Gettier cases are instances in which the subject has a 
 
40 One respected translation has it as “true judgment with an account.” Plato, Theaetetus, 
in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 157–234, 223 201d (John M. Cooper ed., M.J. Levett tran., 
1997). 
41 Edmund Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). But 
see Julien Dutant, The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis, 29 PHILOS. PERSPECT. 
95–145 (2015). (Giving a revisionist history of the Justified True Belief account of 
knowledge.) 
 16 
 
justified, true belief and yet the intuition is that they lack knowledge. 
Prefiguring Gettier, Bertrand Russell offers his famous stopped clock case, 
in which a person walks by a stopped clock that happens to display the correct 
time.42 We’re meant to think that, though the person who walks by is justified 
in believing the time based on what the clock reads, and truly believes that it 
is the time the clock displays, he nevertheless fails to know the time. Gettier, 
in his article, offers similar cases, and in the half-century that’s followed, 
scholars have both offered new cases and tried to determine the missing 
necessary condition for knowledge, or else to make more robust the 
justificatory condition. So-called lottery cases, in which one assigns very high 
probability to their having lost the lottery, but fails to believe or know it, have 
occasioned a similar kind of response.43 
The important question we should ask is whether the kinds of answers 
to Gettier and lottery type cases are, even if correct in that context, relevant 
to the legal case. I believe that they are largely not. Notwithstanding the 
correct answer to that question, scholars have not done enough to make the 
connection explicit. Thus, even if it’s the case that Gettier-style 
counterexamples show that one or another quality beliefs can have is 
necessary for knowledge or belief, it is a further question what relevance this 
 
42 BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 170–1 (1948). 
43 See, e.g., Sinan Dogramaci, A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism, 168 
PHILOS. STUD. 355–369, 359 (2014). (Arguing, in part, that the statistical inference in lottery 
cases does not suffice for knowledge.) 
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has for legal factfinding.  
1. Knowledge  
 
Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that in order for evidence to be 
sufficient for conviction, there has to be a causal connection between the 
evidence presented and the crime. Like knowledge, a verdict should not rest 
on luck. As Thomson puts it, someone’s “…reason for believing that p is true 
must ensure, or guarantee, that p is true.”44 For example, in Blue Bus, the 
bus’s blueness causally explains the testimony.45 In contrast to statistical 
evidence, she writes, “…individualized evidence for a defendant’s guilt is 
evidence which is in an appropriate way causally connected with the 
(putative) fact that the defendant is guilty, and hence (putatively) guarantees 
the defendant’s guilt…”46 For example, if the witness testified that they had 
seen a red cab cause the accident, then if the red cab actually did cause the 
accident, that would causally explain why the witness seemed to see the red 
cab cause the accident.47  
In a response to the Thomson-type argument, Ferdinand Schoeman 
points out that the law makes no such distinction between evidence that is 
 
44 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49 LAW CONTEMP. 
PROBL. 199, 208 (1986). 
45 See Gardiner, supra note 22 at 4–7. (Offering a treatment of Thomson’s argument. 
Importantly, Gardiner worries Thomson’s account of causality is underexplained, and argues 
that statistical evidence can play the relevant causal role Thomson desires. Second, Gardiner 
worries about Thomson’s guarantee condition, especially as it would pertain to DNA 
evidence.)  
46 Thomson, supra note 44 at 214. 
47 Id. at 203.  
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and is not causally relevant. Focusing on Thomson’s distinction between 
“internal” and “external evidence,” he writes “she does not explain why we 
should require evidence to be internal before we regard it as reliably 
probative.”48 That her causality requirement is intuitive but not easy to 
explain is something Thomson herself recognizes.49 She essentially compares 
it to an anti-luck condition for knowledge. She argues that it is unjust for the 
jury to convict when it is just by luck if the jury gets things right. 
But what Thomson does not do, as she says it is difficult to do, is give 
a principled reason for thinking that this causal connection, even if necessary 
for knowledge, is necessary in legal settings.  
In her book, Probabilistic Knowledge, Sarah Moss applies her novel 
account of knowledge—that the object of knowledge is probabilistic content, 
rather than propositional—to the statistical evidence paradox.50 Describing 
with some approval the work others have done to argue that knowledge is 
required for holding a defendant responsible, Moss notes, however, that even 
if the knowledge requirement seems apt for juries in criminal cases, where 
the standard of proof is very high, it seems inapt in civil cases, where the 
 
48 Ferdinand Schoeman, Statistical vs. Direct Evidence, 21 NOÛS 179, 190 (1987). 
49 “If we had individualized evidence…then we would feel considerably less reluctant 
to impose liability on Red Cab. Why is that? That seems to me a very hard question to 
answer.” Thomson, supra note 44 at 205. She adds, implicating others: “Friends of the idea 
that individualized evidence is required for conviction have not really made it clear why this 
should be thought true.” (206).  
50 MOSS, supra note 11. For a summary and review of Moss’s main contributions, see 
Kenny Easwaran, Review of Probabilistic Knowledge, NOTRE DAME PHILOS. REV. (2018), 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/probabilistic-knowledge/. 
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standard is far lower. As she puts it, “Suppose the criminal standard of proof 
requires a justified full belief that the defendant is guilty. If this is correct, 
then what attitude does the civil standard [the applicable standard in 
Gatecrasher] require?”51 It can’t be full belief; it has to be something like 
more likely than not. But if this were the case merely statistical evidence 
would suffice.  
The advantage of her probabilistic account of knowledge, she says, is that 
it preserves the requirement that the jury know something, which many others 
have argued for in the criminal context. Legal proof, she says, requires 
knowledge, no matter the standard of proof.52 With her new, probabilistic 
account of knowledge, Moss argues that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
requires that the factfinder “know[] a certain probabilistic content, namely 
that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.”53 And, 
whereas the civil standard can’t require that the factfinder know the defendant 
is liable—because the standard of proof is merely preponderance of the 
evidence—as Moss puts it, “…proof of liability by a preponderance of the 
evidence requires that the factfinder know that the defendant is probably 
liable.”54 
 As with Thomson, though, Moss’ discussion lacks an argument for 
 
51 MOSS, supra note 11 at 207. 
52 Id. at 211. 
53 Id. at 201. 
54 Id. at 210. (Emphasis in the original). 
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the view that legal proof requires knowledge. Why should we think that 
defendants have a right that the jury know that they are probably liable? Such 
a right has not been recognized. One reason to be skeptical of a right that the 
jury know the defendant is probably liable, or any even remotely similar 
statement, is that it is absent from a sampling of model civil jury instructions 
on the preponderance of the evidence standard from several U.S. circuit 
courts.55  
2. Belief 
 
Another strategy in this field focuses on degrees of belief, or 
credences, where a credence is the subjective probability one assigns to the 
 
55 3 KEVIN O’MALLEY, JAY GRENIG & WILLIAM LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS 101:41 (6th ed. 2019).: 
3rd Circuit: “[Plaintiff] has the burden of proving [his/her/its] case by what is called the 
preponderance of the evidence. That means [plaintiff] has to prove to you, in light of the all 
the evidence, that what [he/she/it] claims is more likely so than not so. To say it differently: 
if you were to put the evidence favorable to [plaintiff] and the evidence favorable to 
[defendant] on opposite sides of the scales, [plaintiff] would have to make the scales tip 
somewhat on [his/her/its] side. If [plaintiff] fails to meet this burden, the verdict must be for 
[defendant]. If you find after considering all the evidence that a claim or fact is more likely 
so than not so, then the claim or fact has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
 
5th: “Plaintiff [x] has the burden of proving [his/her] case by a preponderance of the 
evidence. To establish by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove something is more 
likely so than not so. If you find that Plaintiff [name] has failed to prove any element of 
[his/her/its] claim by a preponderance of the evidence, then [he/she/it] may not recover on 
that claim.” 
8th: “You will have to decide whether certain facts have been proved [by the greater 
weight of the evidence]. A fact has been proved [by the greater weight of the evidence], if 
you find that it is more likely true than not true. You decide that by considering all of the 
evidence and deciding what evidence is more believable.” 
9th: “When a party has the burden of proving any claim…by a preponderance of the 
evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim … is more probably 
true than not true.” 
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truth of a proposition.56 There is much debate over the relationship between 
credences and belief—in particular, whether the latter is reduceable to the 
former. One might think that belief just is credence past a certain threshold—
whether stable or context-dependent. 
Lara Buchak weighs in on this debate. She first argues that beliefs do 
not reduce to credences, and that this is explained, at least in part, by the 
unique role belief plays in assigning blame.57 She gives cases that are meant 
to elicit the intuition that two cases, both of which license the same degree of 
belief, do not both license belief, because in only one of the cases is blame 
appropriate. In the cases Buchak gives, the only important difference is that 
the evidence in one case is statistical, and individualized in the other. But, 
she says, “…what is interesting about statistical evidence is that it is often by 
itself not enough to produce a belief that p, even when [the credence] is very 
high.”58 Belief and credences are sensitive to different kinds of evidence, she 
writes. And blame is sensitive to belief, but not credence.59 She articulates 
the subjective version of the BLAME NORM: “Blame someone if and only 
if you believe (or know) that she has transgressed…”60 Because juries are 
called on not only to determine the facts, but also to “take a stand about 
 
56 Sam Fox Krauss, Lying, risk and accuracy, 77 ANALYSIS 726–734, 727 (2017). 
57 Lara Buchak, Belief, credence, and norms, 169 PHILOS. STUD. 285–311 (2014). 
58 Id. at 292. 
59 Id. at 296–7. 
60 Id. at 299. 
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whether [the defendant] is guilty,” and because (by the BLAME NORM) 
assigning blame requires belief, and because statistical evidence cannot give 
rise to belief, statistical evidence alone cannot license a jury’s verdict.61  
Andrea Roth makes a similar claim. She writes that the reasonable 
doubt standard “…requires factfinders to reach an ‘actual belief’ in, rather 
than an acknowledgment of a high probability of, the defendant’s guilt.”62 
Her explanation is largely historical, and draws from the common law notion 
of “moral certainty,” which, at least historically, must be based on testimony 
and perception, and which the “reasonable doubt” language replaced in the 
19th Century.63 
There are a few ways to dispute Buchak’s claims. First, we might bite 
the bullet and contest her description of the intuitions she has in the cases—
perhaps we would count ourselves as having a full belief in the statistical 
cases she gives. Second, we might contest her description of blame as 
requiring belief and not merely high credence. That is, we might think to 
ourselves well, even if I wouldn’t have had the belief, my high credence does 
license blame. But perhaps the most profitable response we could make to 
Buchak is to dispute that the trial’s role is the assignment of blame, at least 
in the way she describes. One might say that if the trial’s role is to assign 
 
61 Id. at 301. 
62 Roth, supra note 28 at 1159. 
63 Id. at 1160. 
 23 
 
blame, it’s something different from what she requires for interpersonal 
blame in the cases she presents. And, even if she’s right in the criminal 
context, (I  don’t believe that she is), it’s far from clear that the purpose of a 
civil trial is to assign blame in any sense reminiscent of the reactive attitudes 
we have toward each other.64 For example, one prominent strain of tort 
theory—the economic approach—does not countenance blame, in any moral 
sense, at all.65  
II.  STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AS SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION OR A LIABILITY 
JUDGMENT 
 
A.  The Legal Landscape 
 
Philosophers who argue for the insufficiency of statistical evidence in 
the legal context often overstate the extent to which the courts agree with 
them. 66 (Though, in their defense, it is often difficult to track the courts’ less 
 
64 Buchak, supra note 57 at 304.  
65 Judge Calabresi describes tort law in the following way: “[It is] axiomatic that the 
principle function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs 
of avoiding accidents…” (Cited in Richard A Posner, Guido Calabresi’s “The Costs of 
Accidents”: A Reassessment, 64 MD. LAW REV. 12–23, 15–16 (2005)., quoting The Cost of 
Accidents at 26-28.) 
66 See, e.g., “It is important to note that the statistical evidence is not inadmissible; rather, 
it is insufficient on its own.” (Discussing the evidence in the Blue Bus case, in particular. 
Emphasis in the original). Buchak, supra note 57 at 290–91.  
“In [a version of the Gatecrasher case,] courts will find for the defendant.” Michael 
Blome-Tillmann, Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, 4 
THOUGHT J. PHILOS. 102–112, 103 (2015)., Adding, “The intuitive distinction between 
individual and bare statistical evidence can be found in a large number of court judgments 
and is drawn frequently, with more or less rigour, in the legal and philosophical literature.” 
Id. at 104.  
“We would never convict someone of a crime based on statistical evidence alone.” 
Elizabeth Jackson, Belief, Credence, and Evidence, SYNTHESE 1–20, 5 (forthcoming).  
“Law courts would not adjudicate in favor of the claimants…” (Giving versions of five 
canonical cases, including Gatecrasher, Blue Bus, and Prison Yard.) (Gardiner, forthcoming, 
3).  
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than systematic approach to statistical evidence.67) But philosophers do not 
engage, to any significant degree, with the cases in which statistical inference 
is sufficient for liability in the civil context. While it may be true that courts 
would regard as insufficient the statistical evidence available in the canonical 
cases presented in the philosophical literature, there are many, many kinds of 
cases in which the courts permit statistical evidence to be sufficient. For 
example, statistical evidence is sufficient in employment discrimination cases 
and in market share liability cases. Slightly more controversially, statistical 
evidence is used, decisively, in bail and sentencing determinations, although 
these are not subject to the same standard of proof considerations as 
determinations of guilt or liability.68  
 
Smith 2018 and Dant 1988, respectively, make somewhat weaker claims, which seem a 
bit misleading nonetheless (though I don’t mean to suggest intentionally so): “Indeed, it 
seems generally true that courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts—verdicts of guilt 
or liability—on evidence that is purely statistical in nature.” Martin Smith, When Does 
Evidence Suffice for Conviction?, 127 MIND 1193–1218, 1195 (2018). Adding, “…courts’ 
general reluctance to rely on purely statistical evidence.” (1213, fn 18) but noting, in 
addition, that “…the legal treatment of statistical evidence has not been entirely consistent.” 
(1195, fn 3). 
 “Courts and commentators often defend the traditional view that statistical evidence is 
alone insufficient to support a verdict by appealing to the injustice of imposing liability based 
on statistical data.” Mary Gant, Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical 
Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability, 22 COLUMBIA J. LAW SOC. PROBL. 31–70, 33 (1988).  
67 See, e.g., the difference in the Supreme Court’s holdings in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 388 
(2011), as discussed in Robert Bone, Tyson Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication, 
95 N. C. LAW REV. 607–670 (2017). See also Amit Pundik, who notes that “case law seems 
to lack a systematic approach to statistical evidence.” Pundik, supra note 2 at 117. But see 
Koehler, supra note 14. (Giving a systematic assessment of when courts seem to approve or 
disapprove of the sufficiency of statistical evidence). 
68 Distinct from the use of statistical evidence in trials, the use of so-called “risk-
assessment” in bail and sentencing is thought by some to be subject to racial bias, which 
would constitute both an accuracy-based epistemic reason and a policy reason against its use. 
See, e.g., Sandra Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE LAW J., 6 (2019).; Christopher 
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Of course, that judges have held that statistical evidence is sometimes 
sufficient does not justify the practice, but to the extent it is endorsed for 
principled reasons, in a variety of cases, despite what is broadly denied or 
downplayed in the philosophical literature, and to the extent that it constitutes 
good policy, the traditional view merits reconsideration. Below, I highlight 
several instances in which the courts have held that statistical evidence is 
sufficient for liability judgments, and argue that, were we to countenance the 
arguments made by many philosophers, remedies would be largely 
unavailable to different kinds of injured parties.  
1. The Criminal Context 
 
As forensic science has become more sophisticated, DNA evidence’s 
use in criminal trials has increased,69 as have debates about its proper use.70 
In a pure cold hit, the DNA match between the defendant and the relevant 
material is the only evidence. Some criminal defendants have attempted to 
argue that cold hit DNA evidence cannot be sufficient for conviction because 
it puts them in a class of suspects rather than uniquely identifying them as the 
culprit. But, as Andrea Roth puts it, appellate courts have “uniformly 
 
Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. 
LAW 583, 589–593 (2018). (Arguing that, properly guided by the relevant principles of fit, 
validity, and fairness, risk-assessment algorithms are to be preferred over individualized 
professional judgment).  
69 Roth, supra note 28 at 1140–41.  
70 See David Wasserman, Forensic DNA Typing, in A COMPANION TO GENETHICS 349–
363, 349 (Justine Burley & John Harris eds., 2004); ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING WITH 
DNA EVIDENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 136 (2007). 
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rejected” these arguments.71 This is broadly in line with Jonathan Koehler’s 
descriptive analysis of when courts tend to allow the sufficiency of statistical 
evidence: DNA cases represent instances where judges tend to allow the 
sufficiency of statistical evidence because they “rebut the suggestion that the 
outcome arose by chance.” 72  
In most cases, the courts have relied on the extremely high probability 
of the DNA evidence’s accuracy.73 As Roth sees it, the court’s willingness to 
countenance this is because the probabilities of correct DNA matches can be 
incredibly high—so high as to license “actual belief”, or moral certainty. 
Putting it slightly differently, Roth writes, “…when source probabilities are 
high enough, they are effectively transformed into statements of certainty 
rather than probability.”74 
If, as Roth argues, the difference between DNA evidence and other 
statistical evidence is the extremely high likelihood of a correct match, this is 
inconsistent with the explanations for the intuitions expressed about 
Gatecrasher-style cases in most of the philosophical literature.75 As one pair 
of scholars put it, “[i]t will be interesting to see whether such legal theories 
 
71 Roth, supra note 28 at 1150. See also Missouri v. Abdelmalik, 273 S.W.3d 61 (2008), 
cited in Di Bello, supra note 5 at fn 46 pg 30. 
72 Koehler, supra note 14 at 388–89. 
73 Roth, supra note 28 at 1150. 
74 Id. at 1158–59. 
75 Marcello Di Bello is one notable exception. He argues, for accuracy-based epistemic 
reasons, that we ought not rely on statistics in the Prison Yard-type cases but we may be able 
to in DNA evidence cases. Di Bello, supra note 5 at 29–32.  
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will be challenged by the sheer statistical power of the probabilities generated 
by forensic DNA matches, which, some might say, make the DNA database 
‘a system not of evidence but of proof.’”76 But the point of the Prison Yard 
style cases, I took it, is to show that no matter how many prisoners there are, 
no matter how confident the jury should be in the defendant’s guilt, when that 
high confidence is based on statistical evidence alone this does not suffice for 
conviction.  
Relatedly, Martin Smith’s argument for the insufficiency of statistical 
evidence in the legal domain relies on his “normic support” condition, where 
“a body of evidence E normically supports a proposition P just in case the 
circumstances in which E is true and P is false would be less normal, in the 
sense of requiring more explanation, than the circumstances in which E and 
P are both true.”77 Thus, even where the probability of some event is low it 
may not call out for much explanation, like, for example, winning the lottery: 
“The fact that there are 100 tickets in the lottery and only one winner does 
not normically support the proposition that ticket #72 has lost.”78 Thus, we 
can’t say we know that our ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, even though we 
could know, say, by testimony of a mostly-reliable witness, that the defendant 
committed the crime. In the Blue Bus case, for example, if the generally 
 
76 Simon A. Cole & Michael Lynch, The Social and Legal Construction of Suspects, 2 
ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 39–60, 51 (2006).  
77 Smith, supra note 66 at 1208. 
78 id. 
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reliable witness had got things wrong—if she had hallucinated, or the Yellow 
Bus company had for some reason painted its busses blue and put “Blue Bus 
Company” signs on them, then we would expect some sort of explanation. 
As Smith puts it,  
“It can’t ‘just happen’ that the testimony was wrong. But it could 
just so happen that the bus was not a Blue-bus in spite of the fact that 
90% of the buses operating in the area on the day in question were 
Blue-Bus busses. While this might in a sense be surprising, given the 
proportions involved, it clearly wouldn’t demand any kind of further 
explanation.”79 
 
But as he notes, “A normic standard of proof would block pure cold 
hit DNA convictions,” which tend to be allowed by the courts.80 How should 
we resolve this discrepancy, does he think? “The clash with the normic 
standard could be portrayed as a reason for being critical of such convictions, 
but could also be seen as a reason for resisting the standard and seeking an 
alternative solution to the legal puzzle of statistical evidence.”81 (Though he 
seems not to see this as a sufficient reason to do so.) Moreover, Smith’s 
account would have trouble countenancing other kinds of cases in which the 
courts routinely rely on statistical evidence. Would it call out for explanation 
if what seemed to be a pattern of discriminatory behavior in an employment 
scenario, for example, wasn’t intentional? On the normic support view, it 
seems like it wouldn’t.  
 
79 id. 
80 id at 1214. 
81 id. 
 29 
 
And, while Sarah Moss addresses the sufficiency of DNA evidence 
for knowledge, she doesn’t quite say whether, on her view of probabilistic 
knowledge, when (if ever) it could be. 82 
One promising response is offered by Enoch and Fisher, who 
effectively highlight the often-confused way in which scholars discuss 
“statistical evidence.” They describe DNA evidence as “statistical evidence,” 
but argue that one draws not a statistical inference from such data, but rather 
an inference to the best explanation. Rather than inferring from the 
defendant’s membership in some class that they are likely guilty, an inference 
from DNA evidence posits that the best explanation for the DNA match is 
that the defendant committed the crime.83 In this sense, while the evidence 
does appear statistical in nature, the inference involving it is not properly 
analogous to the paradoxical cases commonly given. This line of argument is 
one promising way for those who dislike statistical inference for legal 
liability to preserve the sufficiency of DNA evidence.84  
 
2. The Civil Context 
 
In the civil context, statistical evidence is widely admitted into 
evidence, and is often sufficient for the plaintiff to win.85 This is not to say 
 
82 MOSS, supra note 11 at 218. 
83 Enoch and Fisher, supra note 7 at III.C. 
84 Thanks to Sinan Dogramaci for bringing this to my attention. As far as I could tell, 
Enoch and Fisher are the only authors, in either the legal or philosophical literature, to make 
this distinction.  
85 Stephen E Fienberg, Gatecrashers, Blue Buses, and the Bayesian Representation of 
Legal Evidence, 66 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 693, 699 (1986).(Pointing out that although 
statistical evidence is rarely the only relevant evidence, where it is used it “far outweighs” 
the other evidence presented.) 699  
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that the Gatecrasher and Blue Bus cases don’t have persuasive force. But to 
use these hypotheticals, or real-world approximations of them, as evidence 
that we ought not, or that the courts do not, consider similar evidence 
sufficient is improper. Courts have held that statistical evidence is sufficient 
for a particular ruling when so-called individualized evidence is impossible 
to gather. Here again, this is broadly in line with Koehler’s analysis of courts’ 
inclination toward or against the sufficiency of statistical evidence. He finds 
that courts permit the evidence to be sufficient, one is where there exists no 
particularized information.86 In general, courts have allowed for the 
sufficiency of statistical evidence when, otherwise, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, for genuinely injured parties to collect damages. 
In toxic torts cases, for example, plaintiffs sue whoever is responsible 
for exposing them to toxins that they allege are the cause of their medical 
malady. Because it is often impossible to show that, say, a company’s toxic 
dump caused their disease, plaintiffs rely on epidemiological evidence to 
show causation between the company’s dump and their illness by showing an 
increase in disease relative to the normal incidence of the same disease in the 
population.  
As the court wrote in a representative and much discussed case, in 
 
86 Koehler, supra note 14 at 387–88. Adding that market share liability cases “provide 
another context in which general base rates are sometimes regarded as relevant, admissible, 
and even dispositive.” (at 399). 
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toxic tort cases: 
“[because] the chance that there would be particularistic 
evidence is in most cases quite small, the consequence of 
retaining the requirement [for particularistic evidence] might 
be to allow defendants who, it is virtually certain, have injured 
thousands of people and caused billions of dollars in damages, 
to escape liability.”87  
 
Relatedly, in market share liability cases, for example—cases 
involving an injury from taking a generic drug produced by one of a small 
number of  manufacturers—the courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs even 
where they cannot show particularized evidence that the pill that made them 
ill came from any one manufacturer, in particular. Rather, the manufacturers 
of the drug are held liable in proportion to their share of the relevant market.88  
Courts have ruled in a similar manner in employment discrimination 
cases, where, for example, it is alleged that an employer hires too few 
minority employees given the number of qualified minority employees in the 
 
87 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 836 (1984). For 
discussion, see Gant, supra note 66 at 61–69. 
88 See Sindel v. Abbot 1980 611-13; and Hymowitz 1989 at 511-512. For discussion, see 
David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked 
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 487–516 (1982). 
(Arguing that, in multi-defendant cases, an interpretation of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard consistent with the reasoning of e.g., Sindel, is appropriate); Koehler, 
supra note 14 at 399–400. (Pointing out that Sindel is indicative of the courts’ willingness to 
rely on statistical evidence when it would be implausible for plaintiffs to offer individualized 
evidence); Sara Moss discusses this case very briefly. Moss’ view, she writes, can account 
for the differing intuitions about the ability of statistical evidence to suffice for knowledge. 
But, it’s not clear what Moss has to say about these kinds of cases. She writes that her 
“account of statistical evidence has an unusual strength: it can explain why verdicts against 
defendants [who are persons,] in Prison Yard and Gatecrasher seem especially intolerable 
in comparison with other verdicts [like Sindel] that might or might not be licensed by 
statistical evidence.” MOSS, supra note 11 at 219. (Emphasis added.) 
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relevant population.89 And in antitrust law.90 And securities class action 
cases.91 And in class action lawsuits: In Tyson Foods, for example, plaintiffs 
were workers at a meat processing plant who sued when they were not paid 
for time spent putting on and taking off protective work gear. The court 
allowed statistical sampling (using average times it took workers to dress) to 
determine whether workers were underpaid.92  
3. Fairness Considerations 
 
The sufficiency of statistical evidence for liability gives some reason 
to worry about fairness. Not only does it appear unfair to punish a person 
based on evidence that (admittedly) leaves a large chance of error and has 
 
89 See Bone, supra note 67 at 612.“…disparate impact in a Title VII [of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination on various grounds, including race, sex, 
and religion] is essentially a statistical concept calling for statistical proof.”; Koehler, supra 
note 14 at 386.; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and; Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 US. 557  (cited in Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best 
Explanation, 27 LAW PHILOS. 223–268, 264, fn 137 (2008).); Hazelwood School District v. 
US 433 U.S. 229 (Cited in Koehler, supra note 14 at 386.) 
90 See, Bone, supra note 67 at 612.: “…statistical modeling is used in antitrust suits to 
determine damages when it is impossible to know directly what the counterfactual market 
free from the antitrust violation would have looked like.” Adding, in the antitrust case, 
“statistical evidence is the obvious—and often the only—way to prove the issue and generate 
a reasonably correct substantive result for each individual case.” (id).  
91 See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 34 S.Ct. 2398 (Cited in Ronald 
J Allen & Michael S Pardo, Relative plausibility and its critics, INT. J. EVID. PROOF 1–55, 24 
(2019).; Michelle Burtis, Johnah Gelbach & Bruce Kobayashi, Error Costs, Legal Standards 
of Proof, and Statistical Significance, 25 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2017). 
92 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048. For discussion, see Bone, 
supra note 67; Allen and Pardo, supra note 91 at 24. Although, there is reason to think that 
this is a case of statistical sampling, and ought to be distinguished from the use of statistical 
evidence, e.g., base rates, Bone, supra note 67 at 2.: “[The Supreme Court] treats the case as 
one involving statistical evidence and employee-specific inferences when it actually involves 
substituting statistical averages for employee-specific fact finding. This makes it more like a 
case of statistical adjudication than a case of statistical evidence.” Id. at 610., but noting, 
however, “The distinction between statistical adjudication and statistical evidence is not 
always perfectly clear or precise.” Id. at 613. 
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nothing to do with that person, in particular, but it also leads to an odd 
conclusion: it allows for the double-counting of evidence. Take the 
Gatecrasher case, for example: If the evidence that 501 attendees went into 
the rodeo without a ticket is sufficient to convict any one of the 1000 guests, 
then it is also sufficient to convict all of the attendees, 499 of whom did buy 
a ticket. And this seems unfair, if not downright ridiculous. How can one 
resolve this apparent difficulty with the use of statistical evidence? There are 
at least three options. 
First, one might bite the bullet here and argue that while this seems 
odd, there is no contradiction or rights violation. Such a result would merely 
be an instantiation of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Civil cases 
admit of a high error rate. Why think there’s any principled difference 
between one case with a high chance of error and a large set of cases with the 
same, as set by the standard of proof? The latter is just what we have now. 
Some objections to this kind of thinking are similar to the legitimacy worries 
that come up in the legal literature—what I’ve called policy reasons against 
the use of statistical evidence, and which I’ve discussed, briefly, above. 
Second, one could point out that this already happens in other 
domains in the law.93  In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, for example, the state used the 
same evidence to try two men for murder, even though the prosecutor knew 
 
93 This is the general strategy in Pundik, supra note 7. 
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at most one was guilty.94 On remand to consider due process violations, the 
Sixth Circuit held that no rights violation occurred: the prosecutions merely 
derived two conclusions from the same body of evidence.95 
Anne Poulin argues that this use of evidence is common, and that such 
use does constitute a due process violation.96 But she notes that courts have 
considered and rejected a number of challenges to the prosecutors using this 
kind of evidence.97 Her style of argument does raise some interesting 
questions about when such a violation occurs, though. According to Poulin, 
it occurs at the time the prosecutor asserts the second position.98 It’s at least 
preliminarily suspect to think that a due process violation occurs, as it were, 
outside the scope of one defendant’s trial. That is, how could it be that 
whether a due process violation occurs at Nancy’s trial depends on what 
happens, say, six months later, in Ron’s trial? But put this oddness aside. 
Some courts have ruled that it is a due process violation for a prosecutor to 
use one bit of evidence to secure mutually exclusive verdicts.99 Alex Nunn 
argues that the use of statistical evidence is a due process violation for a 
 
94 Bradshaw v. Stumpf 545 U.S. 175, 189 (2005). For a description of the case in the 
popular press, see Ken Armstrong, Two Murder Convictions for One Fatal Shot, THE NEW 
YORKER, 2017. 
95 Andrew Pollis, Trying the Trial, 84 GEORGE WASH. LAW REV. 55–120, 87–88 (2016). 
96 Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: 
Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. LAW REV. 1423 (2001). 
97 Id. at 1425 fn 4. 
98 Id. at 1425. 
99  G. Alexander Nunn, The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical 
Evidence, 68 VANDERBILT LAW REV. 1407–1433, 1418 fn 62–63 (2015). 
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similar but distinct reason: the mere fact that some bit of evidence could be 
used to secure the conviction of any number of people constitutes a due 
process violation if that evidence is used, even against one person.100 
As a last response to the problem of double-counting evidence, tort 
law could move wholesale to a sort of modified proportional liability scheme. 
In the market share liability cases discussed above, companies were held 
liable to the extent that their product was represented in the market.101 At 
bottom though, the judgement against any company was determined by the 
likelihood that they caused the harm, and, therefore, the total damage award 
was capped by the extent of the damage. Part of the worry with relying on 
statistical evidence in the Gatecrasher case, as discussed above, is that if 
statistical evidence is sufficient for conviction, the rodeo owner could recover 
more than they are owed. If, for example, the tickets each cost $1, and 499 
guests paid and 501 guests crashed, the owner is owed $501. But if statistical 
evidence alone is sufficient for a judgment, they could collect $1 from each 
of the one thousand guests in 1000 individual trials. This is more than they 
are owed. 
In a modified proportional liability scheme, instead, the owner might 
 
100 “…if the same naked statistical evidence could be used to convict any randomly 
selected member of a population, and the simultaneous conviction of the entire population 
would constitute a due process violation (due to the mutually exclusive nature of the crime), 
then the conviction of even one of those individuals constitutes a due process violation.” Id. 
at 1427. 
101 Supra, note 86. 
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be allowed to collect only $.51 from each guest. Thus, the damage award is 
capped. In a similar manner, in an individual case with statistical evidence, 
the plaintiff could instead recover damages in proportion to the weight of the 
evidence. This would require a more precisified analysis of the evidence, and 
perhaps a more nuanced jury deliberation, but it may be a workaround to 
some of the problems statistical evidence poses. This is not too far from what 
Poulin hints at, as a solution. She suggests, as an option to deal with the 
uncertainty: “…[the prosecutor] may embrace the uncertainty, acknowledge 
that she cannot prove which of the two pulled the trigger, and adjust her 
charge and sentencing goals downward.”102   
B.  A Psychological Explanation  
 
Both philosophers and legal scholars have offered sophisticated, if 
greatly varied, arguments for the insufficiency of statistical evidence as proof 
of guilt or liability. In some cases, the courts have agreed, though in far from 
a systematic way. Insights from psychology may provide an explanation. 
Several psychology studies have found that people are reluctant to 
make judgments about legal responsibility (civil or criminal) when the 
evidence is based on naked statistics.103  This tendency is known as the 
 
102 Poulin, supra note 96 at 1424–5. 
103 Wells, supra note 30; Wright et al., supra note 30; Ori Friedman & John Turri, Is 
Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?, 39 COGN. SCI. 1062–1080 (2015); Keith E. 
Niedermeier, Norbert L. Kerr & Lawrence A. Messé, Jurors’ use of naked statistical 
evidence: Exploring bases and implications of the Wells effect., 76 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
533–542 (1999); Deanna L. Sykes & Joel T. Johnson, Probabilistic Evidence Versus the 
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“Wells Effect” and is named for the author of the first study on this topic. A 
representative statement from a follow-up study captures the phenomenon: 
“…people judge that knowledge is less likely to result from probabilistic 
evidence than from perception, and, moreover, [] people deny that knowledge 
is gained from probabilistic evidence.”104   
In describing the phenomenon, the experimenters have dismissed as 
explanations of reticence: an inability to understand the standard of proof; 
causal relevance; that the evidence is not sufficient to raise subjective 
probabilities to the necessary level; and fairness. In one study, Niedermeier 
et al identify what they call the “ease-of-simulation” effect: that jurors are 
more willing to acquit defendants when they can more easily imagine the 
situation in which the defendant is not guilty—often, but not always, when 
the evidence is circumstantial.105 
Andrea Roth agrees that this can explain often-disparate treatment of 
 
Representation of an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs. Prob’s Dog, 21 BASIC APPL. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 199–212 (1999); Hal R. Arkes, Brittany Shoots-Reinhard & Ryan S. Mayes, 
Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making: Disjunction 
Between Probability and Verdict, 25 J. BEHAV. DECIS. MAK. 276–294 (2012). 
104 Friedman and Turri, supra note 103 at 5–6. 
105 “When probabilistic evidence of a defendant’s guilt contains information that can be 
used to build a possible (even if unlikely) scenario in which another party is responsible, 
jurors will be more reluctant to use that evidence to convict.” Adding, however, “…when 
probabilistic evidence of a defendant’s guilt contains little or no information that can be used 
to construct such an exonerating scenario, jurors will be more willing to rely on that evidence 
to convict.” Niedermeier, Kerr, and Messé, supra note 103 at 541–2. See also, for an 
expanded discussion, Kevin Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 
105 MICH. LAW REV. 241–305, 290–98 (2006). 
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DNA evidence.106 Mike Redmayne too.107 And this explanation appears 
similar to Smith’s account of normic support. And, it is supported by 
Koehler’s finding that courts downplay the probative weight of statistical 
evidence when there is individualized evidence, in addition.108 When the 
context does not merely involve the use of base rates or other statistical 
evidence, but also involves issues of morality, things get even muddier. In a 
now-famous study, Tetlock et al show that when reasoning about sensitive 
moral issues, people are (even) less willing to rely on base rates.109 This 
finding is echoed in another study about statistical evidence at trials, noting 
the decidedly moral nature of the trial—especially criminal trials.110 Indeed, 
 
106 “While juries tend to discount DNA match statistics when they can actually envision 
examples of other potential suspects in the population who might match, they will treat the 
match as ‘compelling proof’ of guilt when they can no longer envision such examples.” Roth, 
supra note 28 at 1168. 
107 “This ‘ease of simulation’ explanation for the data also accounts for results in 
experimental research on DNA evidence. Here it has been found that mathematically 
equivalent ways of expressing the probative force of a DNA match have different effects on 
subjects: subjects think guilt more likely when told that ‘the probability that the suspect 
would match the blood drops if he were not the source is 0.1 percent’ than when told ‘1 in 
1,000 people in Houston who are not the source would also match the blood drops.’ This 
seems to be because the latter formulation makes the possibility of a match with an innocent 
person easier to imagine.” Mike Redmayne, Exploring the Proof Paradoxes, 14 LEG. 
THEORY 281, 304 (2008). 
108 Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?” 395. 
109 “Unparsimonious though it may strike those who aspire to create universal theories 
of social cognition, the current findings suggest that people place a complex host of 
superficially ad hoc content constraints on how they execute trade-offs, use base rates, and 
apply causal schemata to narratives. People who function like intuitive scientists or 
economists in one setting can be quickly transformed into intuitive moralist-theologians 
when provoked by assaults on sacred values.” Philip E. Tetlock et al., The psychology of the 
unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals., 78 J. 
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 853–870, 865–6 (2000). 
110 “…what the laws of probability indicate is likely to have occurred—is generally 
viewed as an unacceptable basis for holding the defendant liable for the actual event.” 
(Discussing Charles Nesson’s argument that even juries who ascribe great weight to the 
evidence nevertheless resist that the defendant committed the crime). Sykes and Johnson, 
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there is some reason to be cautious about relying on intuitions when it comes 
to statistical evidence: base-rate neglect, for example, has been well-
documented.111 
The psychological studies, however, don’t tell us what to do with their 
findings. What we learn is that the behavior of juries is broadly (but not 
entirely) in line with philosophical theory: for non-accuracy based epistemic 
reasons, juries, and to some extent, judges, are less likely to attribute 
responsibility, or knowledge, when the evidence is statistical. But is there 
good reason for doing so? As far I could determine, there is no mention of a 
“Wells Fallacy” in the literature, as there is, for example, in descriptions of 
base rate neglect. The psychological literature merely describes a tendency. 
Perhaps it offers an explanation for why one philosophical theory has largely 
tended one way on the question of statistical evidence. But it does not justify 
the theory.   
CONCLUSION 
I’ve argued that explanations for the insufficiency of statistical 
evidence, even if they provide solid non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons, 
do not convincingly show why legal factfinders should care about these 
reasons. Indeed, in many civil contexts, where otherwise remedies to injured 
parties would be impossible to obtain, statistical evidence’s sufficiency for 
 
supra note 103 at 211. 
111 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124–1131 (1974). 
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liability is necessary. While there may be documented reticence to ascribe 
blame or liability using statistical inference, it’s far from clear that our 
intuitions here ought to guide legal factfinding.  
 
 
* * * 
 
 
